Guilt, Innocence, and Justice in the Julian Assange Case
Last week I argued that some media outlets were publishing stories about the Julian Assange sexual misconduct investigation that seemed to misrepresent both the relevant law and the allegations against him. Despite what you might have read on the web, for instance, consensual sex without a condom isn’t illegal in Sweden.
I didn’t take a position on Assange’s guilt or innocence in that piece, because I don’t have one. I was just trying to make sure that the accusations against him were reported accurately. (Assange is accused of holding a woman down against her will during a sexual encounter, and of failing to comply with her request that he use a condom during sex. He is accused of having sex with another woman without her consent while she slept — again without using a condom.)
When a public figure is accused of misconduct, his supporters are often tempted to minimize the charges against him — to say that the accusations are not merely false, but also unserious. But in this case the accusations are serious. Assange may be guilty or he may be innocent, but he is accused of serious crim
