The End of Public-Employee Unions?
The Supreme Court has been asked to take a case that could deal a crippling blow to the labor movement.
Constitutional scholars sometimes like to commend courts for what they callâthe passive virtuesââa reluctance to become involved in constitutional dispute, a reticence to announce new rules, a preference for standing by earlier decisions (âstare decisisâ).
Judges, too, like to cite what they call âthe canon of constitutional avoidance,â a set of rules designed to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions. In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton promised that the new unionâs courts would have âhave neither force nor will, but merely judgment.â
The truth is that since at least Marbury v. Madison,Courts and Justices have hinted, signaled, begged, and reached out to litigants to bring them issues where one or more justice thinks the law needs to change. On the current Court, few of the Justices have signaled quite as vigorously as Justice Samuel Alito. Alito, a man of firm likes and dislikes, has twice questioned the constitutionality of public-employee contracts. Neither case, however, presented the chance to invalidate them.
Now his moment may have come. In response to Alitoâs hints, the issue has landed squarely in the Courtâs inbox in the form of a petition for review in a suit against the California Teachers Association. If Alito gets his desired result, it will deal a long-lasting blow to union powerâand, perhaps by coincidence, the Democratic Party.
Hereâs the issue: Even in union states, public employees cannot be required to join a union. Such a requirement, the Court has said, would violate their First Amendment rights, because that would be the government requiring them to speak and associate against their will. However, state governments can sign agreements with unions designating the union as the official bargaining agent for all employees, members or not. The union then must represent both members and non-membersâand representation costs money, in the form of lawyers, economists, researchers, and so forth. Non-members are thus potentially âfree ridersâ who get a service paid for by their fellow workers.
In response, a compromise developed called the âagency-feeâ or âfair-shareâ payment. Requiring objectors to pay for political activities or lobbying would be âcompelled political speech,â and violate the First Amendment. However, under the âfair shareâ system, non-members are charged a fee that excludes these political activities and is designated to cover only the chargeable costs of actual representationânegotiating contracts, administering benefit programs, and helping employees with grievances.
The âfair shareâ fee is Alitoâs current target. In a 1977 case called Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Burger Court said the fees do not violate the First Amendment: âPublic employees are not basically different from private employees,â the Court said. â[O]n the whole, they have the same sort of skills, the same needs, and seek the same advantages.â The subjects of collective bargaining are the same in either case. Wages and working conditions in the Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association - The Atlantic: